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Petitioners-Appellants Walter and Judith Kimbrough ("Kimbrough"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Kristen R Thompson of Thompson Law Firm, respectfully submits this
Appellants' Brief in support of their appeal of the District Court's Judgment and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law entered April 1, 2009 at the closing of the trail de novo, the Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered May 18, 2009 and its Amended Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered September 17, 2009, and the Judgment entered
June 29, 2009. Petitioners-Appellants appeal the verdict of The Honorable Gregory M. Culet,
District Court Judge, and his findings that the decisions of the Canyon County Board of
Equalization ("Board of Equalization") and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals ("Board of Tax
Appeals") he upheld.

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Kimbrough presented before the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho in

Canyon County on April 1,2009 their case regarding the tax assessment on their property located at
4288 Dye Lane, Kuna, Canyon County, Idaho. The property consists of approximately 14.76 acres
designated as agricultural property and taxed accordingly. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at
Page 217 Lines 20-25; Page 218 Lines 1-5). There is no dispute in this action as to the validity of
the agricultural exemption to Kimhrough's property. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page
229 Lines 7-10).

The District Court in a trial de novo pursuant to LC. 5 63-3812 was presented evidence, and
entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Court reviewed and ruled on several
issues that are now presented to this Honorable Court for consideration.
The first issue on appeal is whether or not, under LC.

5

63-604, the Respondents can

arbitrarily carve from the agricultural exempt property one (1) acre and the homestead sitting on that
acre for taxation and negate the agricultural exemption that has historically been applied to the
property.
The second issue on appeal is whether IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is consistent and a proper
application of LC.

5

63-604, and if this tax regulation was followed by the Canyon County

Assessor's Office when evaluating the Kimbrough property located at 4288 Dye Lane.
The third issue decided by the District Court was never presented to it in the pleadings by
either Kimbrough or the Respondents. The District Court in its Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law found that once Kimbrough claimed a residential homestead exemption
pursuant to I.C.

5 63-602G that their property or a portion of their property as arbitrarily defined by

the Respondents, could no longer qualify as agriculturally exempt property exemption under I.C. 5
63-604. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 21 1 Lines 10-21).
Finally, Kimbrough brings before the Court the arbitrary and capricious nature of the
comparative properties the assessor used to assess the Kimbrough property. (Transcript Proceeding
of 04/01/09 at Page 168 Lines 8-22). Kimbrough believes that improper comparatives were utilized
in assessing the property, which resulted in the astronomical increase in taxable value of the
property. ($134,200 in 2006 to $329,875 in 2007). The resulting increase supports Kimbrough's

position that the comparables and arbitrary assignment of classification of the homestead to one (1)
acre increased the property value improperly. The Respondents' assessment did not reflect the rural
nature of the Kimbrough property as required under the statute for comparative analysis.
(Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 174 Lines 16-25; Page 175 Lines 1-25; Page 176 Lines
1-22). These values were, therefore, an arbitrary valuation for tax purposes and do not reflect the
fair market value or full cash value of the property when deemed properly as rural and agricultural.
B.

Course of Proceedings
1.

Kimbrongh's property evaluation on 4288 Dye Lane, Kuna, Canyon County, Idaho

in 2007 was evaluated at a taxable property value of $329,875. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09
at Page 220 Lines 1-3). The same property was assessed in 2006 at $134.200. (Transcript
Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 219 Lines 24-25; Page 220 Line 1). Kimbrough filed a Property
Tax Appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals on August 17,2007 indicating what they believed to be
the fair market value of their property at $226,130. (Record at Page 000038 - Trial Exhibit 40).
Kimbrough based this evaluation on the assessor's arbitrary practice of designating one (1) acre of
active agricultural land as "residential" when the deed to the property held by Kimbrough indicated
that the entire acreage was zoned "A" or agricultural.
2.

Kimbrough went before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals on November 28, 2007.

Kimbrough indicated that the issue on appeal was the market value of the rural property. (Record at
Page 000038 -Trial Exhibit 42).
3.

The Board of Tax Appeals reviewed the decision of the Board of Equalization and

held the Board of Equalization's decision increasing the taxes was to be affirmed. (Record at Page

000038 -Trial Exhibit 45). The Board of Tax Appeals on March 6,2008 determined that there had
not been errors in the decision of the Board of Equalization and upheld the value of the Dye Lane
property and therefore affirmed the final evaluation.
4.

Kimbrough appealed this decision to the Board of Tax Appeals, requested a

rehearing on the matter. The rehearing request was denied on April 1, 2008. (Record at Page
000038 -Trial Exhibit 47).
5.

Kimbrough then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Actions on April 25,

2008, which was presented to the Third District Court of the State of Idaho in and for the County of
Canyon, the Honorable Gregory M. Culet presiding. At the trial de novo the Judge entered into the
record various Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and withheld for hrther consideration
several issues. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 220 Lines 11-17).
6.

The District Court held for further review from its April 1, 2009 Findings of Fact

and Conclusion of Law the question of whether or not one (1) acre on which the Kimbrough's
residence is situated could or could not ha& been simultaneously claimed under the residential
property exemption pursuant to I.C. § 63-602G and retain its agricultural exemption under LC. 5 63604.
7.

The District Court review was whether IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is consistent with I.C.

5 63-604 and if the tax regulation followed by the Canyon County Assessor's Office when
evaluating the Kimbrough property on Dye Lane was valid.

8.

In the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the District Court, on

May 18, 2009, found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the evaluation on the
property was incorrect.
9.

On June 25,2009 the District Court issued its Judgment consistent with its Findings

of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
10.

On July 23, 2009 Kimbrough filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme

Court. This is the appeal that presently lies before this Hoiiorable Court.
C.

Statement of Facts
1.

There is no issue of fact that the Kimbrough property, which is the subject of this

case was, at the time of the actions and assessment of the Respondents in 2007 and for the four
(4) years proceeding, exempt and qualified for that exemption under I.C.

5 63-604. (Transcript

Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 229 Lines 7-10).
2.

Neither Respondents nor Kimbrough presented to the Court the issue of the

application of to I.C.

5 63-6020 in their pleadings. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 21 1

Lines 10-25; Page 212 Lines 1-12).
3.

The Respondents applied as the fair market value, a residential property formula for

all of the property, not just the acre it carved from the property. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101/09
at Page 215 Lines 10-25; Page 216 Lines 1-19).

11.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f)(6) Kimbrough presents the following issues on appeal:

1.

Did the District Court err in finding that pursuant to LC.

8 63-604 that the one (1)

acre parcel excluded by the Respondents from the agricultural exempt property was not exempt for
purposes of taxation?
2.

Did the District Court err when finding that an exemption pursuant to LC.

5 63-

602G homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property that was deemed to
be agriculturally exempt under LC. 8 63-604?
3.

Did the District Court err when finding that IDAPA 35.01.03.645 was not

inconsistent with I.C.

5

63-604 making the tax regulations followed by the Canyon County

Assessor's Office?
4.

Did Kimbrough show as a matter of law that the Canyon County Assessor, Canyon

County Board of Equalization and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals acted arbitrarily by appraising
the one (1) acre home site as residential property and the remaining 13.76 acres as irrigated
agricultural property?
5.

Did the District Court err in finding that Kimbrough had not proven by clear and

convincing evidence that valuation placed on the property was incorrect?
111.

ARGUMENT
There was no evidence presented in the record to the District Court to uphold the finding
that I.C. (i 63-6026 the homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property
that was also deemed to be agricultural. The District Court erred in finding that LC. 5 63-604 could
be utilized arbitrarily to carve from a designated agriculturally exempt parcel one (1) acre of ground

for purposes of taxation and deem it residential. The District Court, in reviewing the Respondents
interpretation of the statute in its regulations under IDAPA erroneously determined the statute
allowed the parceling of agriculturally exempt properties in such a fashion. I.C.

5

63-604 is

improperly being applied by the Respondents in an unallowable extension of its authority under
IDAPA 35.01.03.645. The Respondents cannot arbitrarily remove a tax exempt status when no
such instructions are presented by the legislature in the statute to do so. Simply put, the IDAPA
section 35.01.03.645 interpreting I.C. $ 63-604 denied the statutory exemption under LC. $ 63-604.
The District Court erred in extending the application of the exclusion for residential property
exemption with no proper foundation in law. Further, the Court arbitrarily and capriciously
assigned the homestead residential property exemption under LC. $ 63-602G to the Kimbrough
property in exclusion of their undisputed agricultural exemption under LC.

63-604. Nowhere in

the statute does the law allow the Court to so arbitrarily assign the selection of one or the other
exemption. The Respondents acted arbitrarily by appraising the one (1) acre Kimbrough home site
as residential property and the remaining 13.76 acres as agricultural property. This Honorable
Court should reverse the District Court's decision and allow them to maintain their agricultural
exemption on all of their property.
A.

Standard of Review

I.C.

5 63-3812(c) provides that, "Appeals

[from the Board of Tax Appeals] may be based

upon any issue presented by the appellant to the board of tax appeals and shall be heard and
determined by the Court without a jury in a trial de novo on issues in the same manner as though it
were an original proceeding with the court."

The case before the Court was reviewed consistent with LC. 5 63-38 12(c) and reviewed in a
trial de novo by the District Court. Idaho Code 5 63-3812(c) provides that, "Therefore, because a
trial de novo was conducted in district court pursuant to statute and to I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l), the
(Supreme) Court will not review the record independently of the district court's appellate decision."
The normal standard of review for a trial de novo on tax issues is the same as for summary
judgment,
"The proper standard of review in this case is the standard generally employed for reviewing

an appeal from an order of summary judgment. When this Court reviews a district court's decision
on summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court in reviewing
the motion." Estate of Becker v. Cullahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). 'The
facts will be construed in favor of the non-moving party," Id "'Summary judgment is apprapriate if
there are no genuine issues *206**353 of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of
law." Id "The construction and application of a legislative act are pure questions of law as to which
the Supreme Court exercises free review." Roeder Holdings, L. L. C. v. Bd. Of Equalization of Ada
County, 136 Idaho at 81 1-12,4 1 P.3d at 239-40,
B.

The District Caurt erred in finding, pursuant to I.C. 5 63-604, that a one (1) acre
parcel could be excluded by the Respondents from the agriculturally exempt
property and was not exempt for purposes of taxation.
The relevant language of the statute under I.C. $ 63-604 states as follows:

"(1) For property tax purposes, land which is actively devoted to agriculture shall be eligible for
appraisal, assessment and taxation as agricultural property each year it meets one (I) or more of
the following qualifications:

(a) The total area of such land, including the homesite, is more than five (5) contiguous acres,
and is actively devoted to agriculture which means:
(i) It is used to produce field crops including, but not limited to, grains, feed crops, fruits and
vegetables; or
(ii) It is used to produce nursery stock as defined in section 22-2302(11). Idaho Code; or
(iii) It is used by the owner for the grazing of livestock to be sold as part of a for-profit
enterprise, or is leased by the owner to a bona fide lessee for grazing purposes; or
(iv) It is in a cropland retirement or rotation program.
(b) The area of such land is five (5) contiguous acres or less and such land has been actively
devoted to agriculture within the meaning of subsection (l)(a) of this section during the last three
(3) growing seasons; and
(i) It agriculturally produces for sale or home consutnption the equivalent of fifteen percent
(1 5%) or more of the owner's or lessee's annual gross income; or
(ii) It agriculturally produced gross revenues in the immediately preceding year of one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or more. When the area of land is five (5) contiguous acres or less, such land
shall be presumed to be nonagricultural land until it is established that the requirements of this
subsection have been met.
(2) Land shall not be classified or valued as agricultural land which is part of a platted
subdivision with stated restrictions prohibiting its use for agricultural purposes, whether within
or without a city."
Idaho has long recognized agriculture as a key activity in the state. The structure of the
statutes and even the Idaho Constitution acknowledges the favored position of farming in this state.
The legislature enacted the tax exemption for agriculture in 1988 and though its location within the
code has changed the substance of the statue has not changed.

(See Ada County Bd. of

Equalization v. Highlands, Znc. 141 Idaho 202, 108 P.3d 349 Idaho, 2005.) The legislative intent

of the statute was to economically assist f m e r s to stay on their farm and produce agricultural
crops.
Nowhere in LC.

5

63-604 does this statute state that the Respondents can remove the

homestead from the exemption and tax it separately. The statute does not address the exclusion of
the homestead for application of the exemption. In fact, it states just the opposite and includes the
homestead in the requirements for defining the exemption. Had the legislature wished to exclude the
residence of the farmer from the exemption, it clearly would have done so. By the Respondents
interpretation, no farmer could live on their farm and retain their .full agricultural exemption. This is
not what the legislature intended.
Further, there is no valid authority for the Respondents to arbitrarily carve out one (1)
acre of ground and exclude it from the legitimate agricultural exemption that applies to the
property. "This Court held that the Tax Commission did not have the authority to create
regulations imposing additional requirements to qualify for the exemption." Roeder Holdings,

L.L. C. v. Bd Of Equalization ofAda County, 136 Idaho 8 13,41 P.3d 237,241 (2001).
This Court has ruled that the Respondents cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature. "In the absence of valid statutory authority, an administrative agency may not, under
the guise of a regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or exercise its
sublegislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish provisions of a legislative act that is
being administered." Roberts v. Transportation Dep't, 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178
(Ct.App.1991) affd 121 Idaho 723,827 P.2d 1174 (1992).

To exclude the homestead from the farm makes no logical sense when viewed with the
intent of the statute to assist agriculture in its operation in Idaho. Logically, no farm house, or
farmer could fbnction and live on their farm and still maintain their exemption. The statute
exempts the property, "including the homestead." "When interpreting a legislative enactment,
our primary objective is to derive the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute." Huyden Luke

Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,3 12, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005).
The Respondents have further complicated the issue by arbitrarily assigning one (1) acre
to the homestead. There is nothing in the statute, I.C. § 63-604, that supports this action, but
once the step is made to insert the exclusion of the homestead from the agricultural exemption
that applies, then the Respondents feel compelled to grant itself further authority by applying a
one (1) acre standard to the Kimbrough property. The Respondents assessor in testimony
arbitrarily applied and further explained his reach. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 149
Lines 10-25 and Page 150 Lines 1-2). What if the hired help had an additional residence on the
property, would the Respondents then have the authority to expand its exclusion ofthe legitimate
agricultural exemption to more property? Could a farmer then never house his hired help
without losing his agricultural exemption on that property as well? And where in the statue do
the Respondents find the authority to take from the farmer the exemption that the legislature
intended to give?
The statute is clear on its face. The Respondents fail to see this clearly as their error in
application and IDAPA have been compounded through appraisals and application. Idaho Code
63

5 604 does not say the homestead

five (5) acres, it says the homestead a d five (5) acres.

If the legislature had meant the exemption to just apply to the farm land it would not have stated
"the homestead."
"Thus, statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Id. If the
statutory language is unambiguous, we need not engage in statutory construction and are free to
apply the statute's plain meaning. On the other hand, if the statutory language is ambiguous, we
must examine the proffered interpretations and consider the 'context in which [the] language is
used, the evils to be remedied and the objects in view.' " Id.
The context of this statute is agriculture. The Respondents have over stepped their
authority by removing the homestead from the undisputed agricultural exemption.
C.

The District Court erred when finding that an exemption pursuant to I.C. $ 63-602G
homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property that was
deemed to be agriculturally exempt under I.C. $63-604.
A review of I.C.

5

63-602G yields nothing that would prevent a farmer from taking his

agricultural exemption and claiming a residential exemption on the homestead of his property.
Equally important, the legislature enacted the homestead exemption at LC.

5

63-6020 after it

enacted the agricultural exemption in 1988. Therefore, had it intended to make the application of
the exemption exclusive or an alternate exemption to the exemption allowed under LC.

5 63-604, it

could have done so. In the recent case of Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d 130 Idaho,
2009, Jul 07, 2009, the Court stated, "As such, when interpreting a statute, this Court presumes
the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of the statute
clearly indicates otherwise. Tkomson v. City oflewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493
(2002). Generally, this same rule applies in determining whether the Legislature intended to

repeal an existing statute. See State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 559, 309 P.2d 21 1, 215 (1957). In
some instances, however, the Legislature may repeal a statute by implication. See State v.

Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 83-84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1962). Repeal by implication occurs
when "two statutes are inconsistent and irreconcilable." Id. at 83, 375 P.2d at 1006. Courts
disfavor repeal by implication and, therefore, attempt to interpret seemingly conflicting statutes
in a manner that gives effect to both provisions. Id. at 84, 375 P.2d at 1007; Davidson, 78 Idaho
at 559, 309 P.2d at 215. "Where two statutes, governing the same subject, can be reconciled and
construed so as to give effect to both, no repeal occurs, and it is the duty of the courts to so
construe them." Roderick, 85 Idaho at 84,375 P.2d at 1007."
While the Respondents may wish them to be irreconcilable, they are not. There is no
repeal of the agricultural exemption by the enactment of LC. § 63-6020 and the statutes can be
easily reconciled by allowing Kimbrough to take first the undisputed agricultural exemption and
then to apply the homeowners exemption.
Moreover, neither statute allows the Respondents or the District Court to select which of the
two exemptions Kimbroughs may apply to their property. This is an impermissible extension of
authority that must be disallowed by this Court. The Court must give effect to both statutes until or
if the legislature chooses to change either.
D.

The District Court erred when finding that IDAPA 35.01.03.645 was not inconsistent
with I.C. 5 63-604.
As discussed previously IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is an improper extension of I.C. 5 63-604 and

must be revised to be consistent with the intent and language of the statute.

E.

Idaho statute shows as a matter of law the evaluation by the Canyon County
Assessor's Office was improper and placed an improper value on the Appellants'
property.
The Respondents based their assessment on bare land sales in the subjects "general areas."

These involved lots of .5 acre, 1.0 acre, .73 acre, and .77 acre sold in 2006. The comparable sales or
properties were however located in town and not in a nual setting as is the subject property.
(Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 112 Lines 8-25; Page 113 Lines 1-25; Page 114 Lines 125; Page 115 Lines 1-25 and Page 116 Lines 1-13) The appraiser's argument is circular and an
improper application of the statute. His logic is based upon an application of the administmtive rule
IDAPA 35.01.03.645 that the Kimbrough property was residential and did not qualify for the
agricultural exemption. Therefore, he looked to other comparable residences in non-agricultural
areas to evaluate the home and then craved out one (1) acre for evaluation. He selected the
comparables based on a position that they could "potentially" (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at
Page 115 Lines 20-25 and Page 116 Lines 1-13) be used for agriculture but had no agricultural
exemption on them. How then can the comparables be comparable to the Kimbrough property that
does have the agricultural exemption?

The Respondents are struggling with their own

methodology to exclude the agricultural exemption that applies to Kimbrough when a proper
reading of the statute would be to allow the exemption on the property in total.
The Respondents appraiser furher evaluated several outbuildings that are on the "homestead
property" inclusive with the homestead evaluation. These values have no support and therefore
should be denied. "An "arbitrary valuation" for tax purposes is one that does not reflect the fair
market value or full cash value of the property." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 141

Idaho 316, 109 P.3d 170 (205). Kimbrough believes that the evaluation as presented by the
Respondents is just such an arbitrary valuation and should be set aside.
If this Court allows the Respondents to extend their authority to change the exemption on
the Kimbrough property, then it must remand this portion of the case for a proper assessment of
the property.

F.

Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Under I.C.

5

12-1 17(1), "Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or

civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Therefore, if the Appellants prevail,
they ask that this Court award attorney's fees and costs for the appeal and the District Court action.

IV.
CONCLUSIONS
There was no evidence presented in the record to the District Court to uphold the finding
that LC.

5 63-602G the homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property

that was also deemed to be agriculturally exempt. The District Court erred in finding that LC. 5 63604 could be utilized arbitrarily to carve from a designated agriculturally exempt parcel one (1) acre
of ground for purposes of taxation and deem it residential. The District Court, in reviewing the
Respondents interpretation of the statute in its regulations under IDAPA erroneously determined the
statute allowed the parceling of agriculturally exempt properties in such a fashion. Idaho Code

5

63-604 is improperly being applied by the Respondents in an unallowable extension of its authority
under IDAPA 35.01.03.645. The Respondents cannot arbitrarily remove a tax exempt status when
no such instructions are presented by the legislature in the statute to do so. Simply put, the IDAPA
section 35.01.03.645 enforcing LC.
undisputed exemption under I.C.

5 63-604

5 63-604.

extends the statute to deny Kimbrough proper and

The District Court erred in extending the application of

the exclusion for residential property exemption with no proper foundation in law.
Further, the Court arbitrarily and capriciously assigned the homestead residential property
exemption under LC.

5

63-602G to the Kimbrough property in exclusion of their undisputed

agricultural exemption under I.C. 3 63-604. Nowhere in the statute does the law allow the court to
so arbitrarily assign the selection of one or the other exemption. The Respondents acted arbitrarily
by appraising the one (1) acre Kimbrough home site as residential property and the remaining 13.76
acres as agricultural property. This Honorable Court should reverse the District Court's decision
and allow them to maintain their agricultural exemption on all 14.76 acres.
If this Court finds that the Respondents acted properly in extending its authority under LC. 5
63-604 and the assignment of one or the other of the exemptions available to Kimbrough under
alternatively I.C.

5 63-6026 was proper, then the Respondents must find comparable properties to

make its assessment of the Kimbrough property in its calculation for tax purposes.
By statute, the Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and cost, which should be awarded
by this Honorable Court.
1

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %day

of January 2010, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to
each of the folhwing:

Ty Ketfinski
Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
208-455-5955 f a

\

Legal seekdry

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission

